

Chapter 6 Random Number Generation

- □ Requirements / application
- □ Pseudo-random bit generator
- □ Hardware and software solutions

Requirements and Application Scenarios



- □ Security
 - □ Key generation automatically generated keys must be secure against "prediction" or "estimation"
 - □ *Initialization vectors* many encryption algorithms rely on an IV, thus must be random to prevent guessing
 - □ Authentication security protocols relying on challenge-response exchanges require random numbers
 - □ Further applications in cryptographic algorithms
- Other domains
 - □ Probabilistic decisions if not "random", sequences may be created in long-term applications leading to self-similar behavior
 - □ Simulation techniques calculation of variables following a particular distribution

Random Number Generation



- Hardware-based random bit generators are based on physical phenomena, as:
 - elapsed time between emission of particles during radioactive decay,
 - □ thermal noise from a semiconductor diode or resistor,
 - □ frequency instability of a free running oscillator,
 - □ the amount a metal insulator semiconductor capacitor is charged during a fixed period of time,
 - □ air turbulence within a sealed disk drive which causes random fluctuations in disk drive sector read latencies, and
 - sound from a microphone or video input from a camera
- □ A hardware-based random bit generator should ideally be enclosed in some tamper-resistant device and thus shielded from possible attackers

Random Number Generation



- Software-based random bit generators, are based upon processes as:
 - □ the system clock,
 - elapsed time between keystrokes or mouse movement,
 - □ content of input- / output buffers
 - □ user input, and
 - operating system values such as system load and network statistics
- □ Ideally, multiple sources of randomness should be "mixed", e.g. by concatenating their values and computing a cryptographic hash value for the combined value, in order to avoid that an attacker might guess the random value
 - ☐ If, for example, only the system clock is used as a random source, than an attacker might guess random-numbers obtained from that source of randomness if he knows about when they were generated

Random Number Generation



- □ De-skewing:
 - Consider a random generator that produces biased but uncorrelated bits, e.g. it produces 1's with probability $p \neq 0.5$ and 0's with probability 1 p, where p is unknown but fixed
 - ☐ The following technique can be used to obtain a random sequence that is uncorrelated and unbiased:
 - The output sequence of the generator is grouped into pairs of bits
 - All pairs 00 and 11 are discarded
 - For each pair 10 the unbiased generator produces a 1 and for each pair 01 it produces a 0
 - □ Another practical (although not provable) de-skewing technique is to pass sequences whose bits are correlated or biased through a cryptographic hash function such as MD-5 or SHA-1

Statistical Tests for Random Numbers



- The following tests allow to check, if a generated random or pseudorandom sequence inhibits certain statistical properties:
 - Monobit Test: Are there equally many 1's like 0's?
 - □ Serial Test (Two-Bit Test): Are there equally many 00-, 01-, 10-, 11-pairs?
 - □ *Runs Test:* Are the numbers of *runs* (sequences containing only either 0's or 1's) of various lengths as expected for random numbers?
 - □ Autocorrelation Test: Are there correlations between the sequence and (non-cyclic) shifted versions of it?
 - □ *Maurer's Universal Test:* Can the sequence be compressed?
- □ The above descriptions just give the basic ideas of the tests. For a more detailed and mathematical treatment, please refer to sections 5.4.4 and 5.4.5 in [Men97a]



- Definition: A random bit generator is a device or algorithm, which outputs a sequence of statistically independent and unbiased binary digits.
 - □ Remark: A random bit generator can be used to generate uniformly distributed random numbers, e.g. a random integer in the interval [0, n] can be obtained by generating a random bit sequence of length \[\lg n \] + 1 and converting it into a number. If the resulting integer exceeds \(n \) it can be discarded and the process is repeated until an integer in the desired range has been generated.



- Definition: A *pseudo-random bit generator (PRBG)* is a deterministic algorithm which, given a truly random binary sequence of length k, outputs a binary sequence of length m >> k which "appears" to be random. The input to the PRBG is called the *seed* and the output is called a *pseudo-random bit sequence*.
 - □ Remarks:
 - The output of a PRBG is not random, in fact the number of possible output sequences of length *m* is at most all small fraction 2^k / 2^m, as the PRBG produces always the same output sequence for one (fixed) seed
 - The motivation for using a PRBG is that it might be too expensive to produce true random numbers of length *m*, e.g. by coin flipping, so just a smaller amount of random bits is produced and then a pseudorandom bit sequence is produced out of the *k* truly random bits
 - In order to gain confidence in the "randomness" of a pseudo-random sequence, statistical tests are conducted on the produced sequences



- Example:
 - \square A linear congruential generator produces a pseudo-random sequence of numbers $y_1, y_2, ...$ According to the linear recurrence

$$y_i = a \times y_{i-1} + b \mod q$$

with a, b, q being parameters characterizing the PRBG

□ Unfortunately, this generator is predictable even when *a*, *b* and *q* are unknown, and should, therefore, not be used for cryptographic purposes



- Security requirements of PRBGs for use in cryptography
 - □ As a minimum security requirement the length k of the seed to a PRBG should be large enough to make brute-force search over all seeds infeasible for an attacker
 - ☐ The output of a PRBG should be statistically indistinguishable from truly random sequences
 - ☐ The output bits should be unpredictable for an attacker with limited resources, if he does not know the seed



- □ <u>Definition</u>: A PRBG is said to pass all polynomial-time statistical tests, if no polynomial-time algorithm can correctly distinguish between an output sequence of the generator and a truly random sequence of the same length with probability significantly greater than 0.5
 - □ *Polynomial-time algorithm* means, that the running time of the algorithm is bound by a polynomial in the length *m* of the sequence
- □ <u>Definition</u>: A PRBG is said *to pass the next-bit test*, if there is no polynomial-time algorithm which, on input of the first m bits of an output sequence s, can predict the $(m + 1)^{st}$ bit s_{m+1} of the output sequence with probability significantly greater than 0.5
- □ Theorem (universality of the next-bit test):

A PRBG passes the next-bit test ⇔ it passes all polynomial-time statistical tests

□ For the proof, please see section 12.2 in [Sti95a]





Definition: A PRBG that passes the next-bit test – possibly under some plausible but unproved mathematical assumption such as the intractability of the factoring problem for large integers – is called a cryptographically secure pseudo-random bit generator (CSPRBG)

Pseudo-Random Number Generation



- There are a number of algorithms, that use cryptographic hash functions or encryption algorithms for generation of cryptographically secure pseudo random numbers
 - □ Although these schemes can not be proven to be secure, they seem sufficient for most practical situations
- □ One such approach is the ANSI X9.17 generator:
 - □ Input: a random and secret 64-bit seed s, integer m, and 3-DES key K
 - \square Output: m pseudo-random 64-bit strings $y_1, y_2, ... Y_m$
 - 1.) $q = E(K, Date_Time)$
 - 2.) For *i* from 1 to *m* do
 - 2.1) $x_i = E(K, (q \oplus s))$
 - 2.2) $s = E(K, (x_i \oplus q))$
 - 3.) Return($x_1, x_2, ... x_m$)
 - □ This method is a U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) approved method for pseudo-randomly generating keys and initialization vectors for use with DES

Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generation



- □ The RSA-PRBG is a CSPRBG under the assumption that the RSA problem is intractable:
 - \square Output: a pseudo-random bit sequence $z_1, z_2, ..., z_k$ of length k
 - 1.) Setup procedure:

Generate two secret primes p, q suitable for use with RSA Compute $n = p \times q$ and $\Phi = (p - 1) \times (q - 1)$ Select a random integer e such that $1 < e < \Phi$ and $\gcd(e, \Phi) = 1$

- 2.) Select a random integer y_0 (the seed) such that $y_0 \in [1, n]$
- 3.) For *i* from 1 to *k* do
 - 3.1) $y_i = (y_{i-1})^e \mod n$
 - 3.2) z_i = the least significant bit of y_i
- □ The efficiency of the generator can be slightly improved by taking the last j bits of every y_i , with $j = c \times \lg(\lg(n))$ and c is a constant
- □ However, for a given bit-length *m* of *n*, a range of values for the constant *c* such that the algorithm still yields a CSPRBG has not yet been determined

Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generation



- □ The Blum-Blum-Shub-PRBG (BBS) is a CSPRBG under the assumption that the integer factorization problem is intractable:
 - \Box Output: a pseudo-random bit sequence $z_1, z_2, ..., z_k$ of length k
 - 1.) Setup procedure:
 - Generate two large secret and distinct primes p, q such that p, q are each congruent 3 modulo 4 and let $n = p \times q$
 - 2.) Select a random integer s (the seed) such that $s \in [1, n 1]$ such that gcd(s, n) = 1 and let $y_0 = s^2 \mod n$
 - 3.) For *i* from 1 to *k* do
 - 3.1) $y_i = (y_{i-1})^2 \mod n$
 - 3.2) z_i = the least significant bit of y_i
 - □ The efficiency of the generator can be improved using the same method as for the RSA generator with similar constraints on the constant *c*

Summary (what do I need to know)



- Principles
 - □ Random bit generator
 - □ Pseudo-random bit generator
 - Cryptographically secure pseudo-random bit generator
- ☐ Hardware solutions
 - Examples
- □ Software solutions
 - Examples