

Exzess: Hardware-based RAM Encryption against Physical Memory Disclosure

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
2016-04-05



The Problem




The Problem: Cold Boot Attack



Physical Memory Disclosure

- remanence effect
 - DRAM contents readable **after power-down**
 - for a few minutes
- RAM modules
 1. cooled down
 2. physically extracted
 3. contents copied
- endangers:
 - in-use cryptographic keys (X.509, ssh)
 - passwords
 - full-disk-encryption keys
 - other sensitive data




Solutions

- software-based attempts
 - slow:
 - disable caches
 - expensively encrypt everything
 - limited:
 - only protect one 128bit key
 - only apply to certain types of secrets (e.g. FDE keys)
 - incompatible:
 - require extensive software changes



Solutions

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 - limited:
 - only protect one 128bit key
 - only apply to certain types of secrets (e.g. FDE keys)
 - incompatible:
 - require extensive software changes
- hardware-based attempts
 - embedded-only
 - limited scope
 - only for code signed & blessed by third party



Our Proposed Solution

Goals

- work transparently
- multiple uses
- be fast
- hardened hardware

Means


- ⇒ memory as our interface
- ⇒ no painful size limitations
- ⇒ encrypt only important data
- ⇒ be tamper-proof & simple




How?




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
How?




How?



How?




How?




The Exzess FPGA

- PCI Endpoint
 - FPGA IP core
- PCI Express Bus



The Exzess FPGA


- application interface
 - Wishbone to TLP interface
- TLP generator
 - handles upper layers of PCIe protocol stack



The Exzess FPGA

- applications

- XOR "encryption"
- AES in CTR mode
- others possible



Application View

- memory proxy
 - CPU issues write to memory
 - chipset redirects write to device
 - device encrypts data
 - device issues write to memory



Application View


- memory proxy
 - CPU issues write to memory
 - chipset redirects write to device
 - device encrypts data
 - device issues write to memory
- usage
 - mmap the device memory
 - read & write as usual
 - Exzess will transparently ...
 - encrypt
 - decrypt
 - use normal RAM as encrypted backend storage

```
1 char *p = secure_malloc(6);
2
3 strcpy(p, "stuff");
4 do_anything(p);
5
6 secure_free(p);
```




Goals and Attacker Model

- data in physical RAM is encrypted
 - even searching `/dev/mem` is futile
 - only some data: non-secured applications without performance loss
 - large encryptable area: almost your whole RAM
 - RAM extraction useless: also extract & read key from Exzess
- improvements upon the prototype
 - FPGA might have: debug ports, emanations, ...
 - hardening and tamper-proofing: think HSM (Hardware Security Module)




Performance Measurements of Prototype



Measurements on FPGA Prototype, not cached, 4-byte packets



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Measurements on FPGA Prototype, not cached, 4-byte packets

Future Work

- integrate into LUKS, OpenSSL, SSH,...
- hardened hardware
- PCIe firewalling
- beyond encryption: memory proxy application for...
 - debugging
 - data integrity checking
 - redundancy and healing



Conclusion

- Exzess is a working prototype
- can solve cold-boot problem
- interesting concept, even beyond encryption
- encrypting memory proxy
- source code: <https://www4.cs.fau.de/~arw/exzess/>

